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Introduction
It is common knowledge that computer skills are remunerated well in the job market.
Internships are only available for students with an excellent knowledge of word-processing and spreadsheet analysis, employers require at least one programming language, lectures are inconceivable without a video projector running a sophisticated presentation, statistics are impossible without powerful specialized programs, and informatics students can earn twice the salary of a well-paid economist. The objective of this study is to analyze why knowledge of computer applications pays so well. Of course, computer wage differentials may be justified, because computers enable workers to become more productive, which in turn makes them more valuable to their companies. On the other hand, there is much criticism of computer-related productivity improvements, and reasonable doubt that the PC wage premium is due solely to the increased productivity of computer systems. The question is, to what extent can existing PC wage differentials be attributed to computer-increased productivity, and to what extent can they be explained by individual differences in human capital investment or by unobservable individual characteristics such as ability?
Existing studies of computer wage premiums are divided about whether workers receive a computer wage premium because they are more able or because the new technology increases their productivity. According to the productivity-enhancing hypothesis, workers should be remunerated more highly as soon as they start using a computer at work, while the competing hypothesis states that PC users would already have been better-paid before the introduction of the new technology. Most existing studies of the role of computer technology in changes in the wage structure show that workers who use a computer at work earn 10 -20% more than those who do not (see e.g., Krueger 1993 , Bell 1996 , Miller and Mulvey 1997 , and DiNardo and Pischke 1997 . One of the first studies to investigate the impact of computer use on wage differentials, by Krueger (1993) , finds a computer wage premium of up to 15% using crosssection data. By contrast, Oosterbeek (1997) shows that, for the Netherlands, the computer wage premium does not vary with the intensity of computer use. He suggests that returns from computer use can be attributed to factors other than the higher productivity of PC-using workers. This might be the case because workers of high ability do the more demanding computer jobs. Gollac and Kramarz (1997) attribute this phenomenon to the frequent occurrence of changes in (computer) technology as well as in organization, where the capacity to adapt to those changes is rewarded. Furthermore, firms anticipate progress in computerization in the near future, and therefore search for a workforce that is already adapted to the new technology. DiNardo and Pischke (1997) also doubt any causal relationship between the use of computers at work and wage premiums. Using detailed information on German workers' jobs and on the tools used in those jobs, they find evidence of wage differentials ranging from 9% to 14% associated with other "white-collar" tools such as calculators, telephones, and pencils, as well as evidence of a wage penalty linked to "bluecollar" tools. These findings suggest that the tools approximate the occupational wage structure, and that workers who use computers on the job possess unobserved skills, which lead to higher wages.
Whereas cross-section studies are inadequate for capturing the individual components of wage determination, various panel studies have investigated the effect of unobserved heterogeneity on the computer wage premium. Bell (1996) analyzes the impact of computer use on earnings, using data for the United Kingdom. He finds empirical support for the productivity-enhancing explanation in the form of a wage premium for computer use of 17% after the inclusion of worker and employer characteristics, such as firm size, industry and occupation dummies, and one of 14% after adding ability test scores. His findings of a positive relation between wages and PC use at work, using cross-section data for 1991, are confirmed by the panel study and by a cross-section study for 1981, in which he uses future skills (observed in 1991) as covariates. Bell (1996) therefore refutes the suggestion that the computer wage premium simply captures unobserved heterogeneity. This interpretation is also supported by Miller and Mulvey (1997) who conduct a cross-section study for Australia.
However, the studies that use matched employee-employer data, by Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997) for the U.S., and by Kramarz (1994, 1997) for France, demonstrate that new technology workers received a wage premium before the introduction of this technology. These studies find that controlling for firm heterogeneity attenuates the wage premium received by workers for using computer-related new technology. In the longitudinal studies by Kramarz (1994, 1997) , the significance of the computer variables almost completely disappears, whereas the coefficients of computer experience remain significant. They show that the wage premium is due to computer-based new technologies being used by more able workers, which suggests that "firms select their best employees when they need someone to work using computer-based new technology with high autonomy" (Entorf and Kramarz 1994, P. 24) . The preceding results are confirmed by Entorf, Gollac, and Kramarz (1999) , who find that the introduction of individual fixed effects into the longitudinal model leads to a substantially lower computer wage premium than that obtained in the cross-section study. Therefore, they demonstrate that PC users were already better paid before the new technology was introduced in their jobs, and suggest that "unobserved but compensated characteristics of the workers matter" (Entorf, Gollac, and Kramarz 1999, P. 464) . Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1999) doubt that there are computer-use wage differentials worth speaking of in Germany. They find that the significance of coefficients for PC use almost completely disappears in the longitudinal study, and conclude that "for Germany, unobserved individual heterogeneity or ability plays the key role in effectively explaining away the apparent wage premium for using a computer at work" (Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt 1999, P. 10). In this study we extend the model of Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1999) by using future information of computer use as a further control for ability. Our findings reject the productivity hypothesis: the higher pay of PC users cannot be traced back to computer-related productivity increases.
Data
The data used in this study were made available by the German Socio-Economic Panel Study randomly selected adult respondents (in 6,000 families) in the former West Germany in 1984.
After German reunification in 1989, the GSOEP was extended by about 4,500 persons (in 2,200 families) from the former East Germany. In the most recent wave, for 1999, about 13,000 respondents were still participating in the panel study. The GSOEP data is available as a public-use file containing 95% of the GSOEP sample, with some variables omitted for reasons of data protection (see Wagner et al. 1993, or The PChome variable provides a complete picture of a person's computer utilization, and its inclusion reduces bias in the coefficient of PC use at work "due to omitted factors which are associated with computer-use more generally" (Krueger 1993, P. 43) .
Estimation Methods
The first model (I) in this study adopts a simple approach to replicate the cross-sectional findings of most studies on PC wage differentials. For 1999, the standard cross-sectional earnings equation is augmented by a dummy variable indicating whether a worker uses a computer at work. In addition, as well as the use of other control variables, a variable for PC use at home is used to capture some of the unobserved individual characteristics. Let w i be individual i's monthly wage. 4 The Mincer-type specification of the earnings regression is:
(1)
where X i are standard control variables and PC i is a vector of dummy variables, which are equal to unity if the individual uses a computer at work, at home, or both, b and c are vectors of parameters to be estimated, and u i denotes the unobservable effects. At this point, unobserved individual characteristics will be only partially captured, at best, by adding the PChome variable to the regression for computer wage differentials. Model (II) is very similar to model (I) except that, as in the study by Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1999) , panel data is used to run a pooled regression as well as random effects and fixed effects estimations in order to control for unobservable individual characteristics:
An alternative approach to test the productivity-enhancing hypothesis is to include information on future PC use at work in a longitudinal analysis, which might capture unobserved worker characteristics. This approach is similar to that of Bell (1996) 
where dummy variables for computer-use at work after 1987, PC i,88-99 , are included. The variables for PC use indicate whether a survey respondent uses a computer at work today (1985) (1986) (1987) and/or in the future (after 1987) . With regard to future PC use, we distinguish in the first version of model (III) between: no PC use at work in either the first or second period;
no PC use at work in the first period, but some in the second period; and PC use at work in both the first and second periods. In addition to these dummy variables, more detailed information on future PC use is added to another version of model (III); that is, information on when the future PC use at work transpires. A distinction is made between different future PC variables, since PC use in the near future might have a different effect on wages than PC use in the distant future. In the early years of the second period, working with computers at work was evidently rather exceptional given that until 1989 less than 20% of workers were PC users. However, from 1995 onwards, the proportion of PC users was above 50%, and rose even more until 1999, when more than two-thirds of those surveyed used a computer at work, and PC use at work was rather common. Therefore, in the second version of model (III) instead of one future PC variable we use four dummy variables to distinguish between future PC use occurring before 1988 6 , between 1988 and 1990, between 1991 and 1994, and after 1994 . Consequently, the following variables relating to PC use at work are incorporated into the panel study: no PC use today or in the future; no PC use today but some in the immediate future (before 1988); no PC use today but some in the near future (between 1988 and 1990) ; no PC use today but some in the medium future (between 1991 and 1994) ; no PC use today but some in the distant future (after 1994); and PC use today and in the future.
Since the future PC-use variables cannot have a causal effect on current wage determination, one might suppose that the coefficients of the future PC variables will not be significant in the regression analysis. However, wages might be statistically affected by these variables. If PC use at work in the future has a statistical influence on wages today, this suggests that the future PC-use variables capture unobserved worker characteristics such as ability, which does affect earnings. If so, the same might be true of current PC variables. If variables on future PC use are closely related to worker ability, then so too probably are variables on current PC use, which thus capture worker ability rather than productivity effects. This would imply that computer wage differentials merely indicate a wage premium due to unobserved worker characteristics rather than to productivity improvements attributable to computers.
Results
Compared to the cross-sectional study, in which the wage premium from using a PC at work is around 6,5% for men when control variables are included, the computer wage premium estimated by the pooled regression is much smaller, as can be seen in Table 1 . When looking at the random effects estimator, it is striking that all coefficients for, and explanatory power of, the PC-use variables are considerably reduced. In the regressions for men, the dummy variable for PC use at work shrinks to around 1% and loses some of its significance in all three versions of model (II). When the wage equation for female workers is estimated with random effects, all coefficients for the PC use at work variables remain statistically significant, but are substantially reduced to around 2%. The fixed effects estimator applied to model (II) reveals even more sobering results concerning the wage premium from using a computer at work. The PCwork variable is not statistically significant in the regressions for either men or women. Furthermore, the fixed effects model has significantly negative wage premiums for the PChome variable for men, and a significantly positive coefficient for PCboth.
7
7 Using the Hausman test to test the fixed effects model against the random effects model indicates evidence of a correlation between the individual effects and the regressors, which supports the fixed effects assumption. However, the random effects model is superior to the pooled OLS estimator, which is revealed by the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange multiplier test for random effects. The regression analysis reveals that not all wage differentials implied by the future PC-use dummies are statistically significant when standard control variables are included (see Table   2 ). The initial estimates of the first version of model (III) show that both men and women receive a wage premium if they do not use a PC today, but will do so in the future (PC01).
The future wage premium for men is around 3% in the pooled OLS regression and 5% in the random effects model, whereas women receive a future PC-use premium of around 4% according to both regressions. An even higher premium is obtained from using a PC today and in the future (PC11). As can be expected, the coefficients and explanatory power of this dummy variable remain virtually unchanged in both the pooled OLS and random effects specifications when more detailed information on future PC use is added to model (III) by including variables that indicate when a computer would be used for the first time in the future (second version). The division of the future PC-use variable PC01 into four different dummies, PC0, PC1, PC2, and PC3, which indicate how far into the future is the first use of a PC at work, reveals that the point in time does indeed matter. Of the individuals who had not used a PC at work when they were originally surveyed, those who would be using a computer in the near future (PC1) had the highest wage premium on average. The wage equations for male workers reveal coefficients of up to 6% for future PC use PC1 and PC2, while PC use in the immediate future (PC0) or distant future (PC3) has no explanatory power. Women who would be using a PC in the near future receive a premium of 11% relative to those who would not be using a PC at all. In comparison with the wage premiums from the pooled OLS regression, those from the random effects model were slightly higher.
The estimates show that future computer use seems to have an important statistical effect on wage determination, and one that is more than half as strong as that of current computer use. This is evidence against the productivity-enhancing explanation of PC wage differentials, since the statistical influence of future PC use at work on wages today is an indication that future PC-use variables capture worker heterogeneity. Therefore, wages are determined not by future PC use at work (which is impossible anyway), but by unobserved worker characteristics, with future PC use perhaps serving as a proxy for ability. 8 Due to the close association between future PC-use variables and individual characteristics, which are wellremunerated in the labor market, it is quite probable that current PC use at work, instead of generating productivity effects, captures these same characteristics. This is not to deny that workers who use a computer on the job may indeed be more productive. However, according to the findings of this study, higher productivity is not attributable to the use of computers, but rather to individual worker characteristics. Therefore, computer wage differentials are not due to productivity-enhancing computer technology, but arise rather because more able individuals are more likely to use a computer at work, and these individuals would earn a wage premium even in the absence of computer technology.
Conclusion
Having used data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) to analyze wages, we confirm that international evidence for wage differentials also applies to Germany. As other studies have found, computer wage differentials were substantial in the cross-section study for 1999, after including many worker and firm characteristics. However, cross-section results can be spurious, and greatly influenced by worker heterogeneity, and since the GSOEP does not provide information on measured ability, several types of panel study have been carried out to reduce the influence of unobserved worker characteristics and to increase the reliability of the results. The first approach was the conventional method of making use of panel data for the years from 1985 to 1999 provided by the GSOEP. It was found that computer wage premiums were reduced in the pooled OLS and in the random effects specifications, but did not vanish completely. However, in the fixed effects model, all the variables indicating PC use at work were statistically insignificant. Another approach involved the inclusion of dummy variables indicating future PC use in the longitudinal regression. Since future PC-use variables had a statistical influence on the determination of wages, it can be concluded that current PC-use variables also capture those unobserved worker characteristics that affect earnings. The indications from the applied models are that it is not computer-induced productivity, but unobserved yet compensated worker characteristics, that matter. Although we acknowledge the increasing importance of computer skills in the job market, our labor-market policy implication is not to neglect general human capital accumulation. Since it is not sufficient to focus on computer training of workers, more weight should be put on general investments to promote workers' education and their soft skills.
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